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The Honorable Joseph H. Rodriguez, Senior United States District Judge for the*
District of New Jersey, sitting by designation
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                              
No. 07-4712
                              
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
MICHAEL M. WALKER, JR.,
Appellant.
                              
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Criminal Action No. 06-cr-00060-3E)
District Judge: Honorable Maurice B. Cohill, Jr. 
                              
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
December 3, 2008
                              
Before: AMBRO and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges,
and RODRIGUEZ,  District Judge*
(Opinion filed:  December 23, 2008)
                              
OPINION
                              
The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We1
have appellate jurisdiction to review the sentence imposed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1291
and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).  
2
RODRIGUEZ, Senior District Judge 
Michael M. Walker, Jr. appeals from the sentence imposed after he pled guilty to
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute fifty grams or more of cocaine in violation
of 21 U.S.C. § 846.  Walker argues that in sentencing him to 120 months’ incarceration
followed by 60 months of supervised release, the District Court erred in failing to reduce
his criminal history points under the Sentencing Guidelines to enable him to come within
the purview of the statutory safety valve, thereby avoiding a mandatory minimum
sentence.  Walker also contends that his sentence was unreasonable because the District
Court refused to apply the minor participant base offense level reduction provided by the
Sentencing Guidelines.   Because we conclude that Walker validly waived the right to1
appeal his sentence, we will affirm.
I.
As we write solely for the parties, we recite only those facts necessary to our
decision.  In the spring of 2006, with the aid of a confidential informant, members of Erie
Area Gang Law Enforcement (EAGLE) FBI Task Force captured multiple controlled
buys of crack cocaine on both audio and video recording devices.  The evidence gathered
demonstrated that Walker and others were involved in a drug conspiracy and that Walker,
on three separate occasions, was involved in a controlled buy of over five grams of crack
cocaine and aided and abetted the transport of 120 grams of crack cocaine to Erie,
  This Court “retains subject matter jurisdiction over [an] appeal by a defendant2




On October 10, 2006, a federal indictment was unsealed, charging Walker and
several co-conspirators with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and
distribution of fifty grams or more of cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (Count
One).  Walker was also charged with possession with intent to distribute and distribution
of five grams or more (Counts Two, Three, and Six) and fifty grams or more (Count
Seven) of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B)(iii), and
841(b)(1)(A)(iii).  On August 22, 2007, Walker pleaded guilty to Count One of the
Indictment and accepted responsibility for the remaining counts, which were dismissed.
In his plea agreement, Walker waived his right to take a direct appeal from his
conviction or sentence,  subject to certain exceptions: if the Government appealed from2
the sentence, or “[i]f (1) the sentence exceed[ed] the applicable statutory limits set forth
in the United States Sentencing Code, or (2) the sentence unreasonably exceed[ed] the
guideline range determined by the Court under the Sentencing Guidelines,” Walker could
take a direct appeal.  (A12.)
Under the 2007 Sentencing Guidelines, Walker’s base offense level was 30.  He
was credited with two points for acceptance of responsibility and one point for timely
notification of his intent to enter a guilty plea, for a Total Offense Level of 27.  
Walker previously had been convicted of three separate offenses involving the
In 2002, Walker plead guilty to possession of marijuana and possession of drug3
paraphernalia, and was sentenced to pay a $236 fine, yielding one criminal history point
under Guidelines § 4A1.1(c).  
In December of 2002, Walker plead guilty to disorderly conduct, and was
sentenced to 90 days’ probation and a $300 fine.  On April 15, 2003, his probation was
revoked due to an arrest for unlawful possession of marijuana, failure to work regularly,
and failure to make regular payments on his fines.  He was sentenced to 90 days’
incarceration, but given 41 days’ credit since he had been detained from January 30, 2003
due to testing positive for marijuana.  Pursuant to Guidelines § 4A1.1(b), Walker was
assessed two criminal history points on the disorderly conduct.  
In June of 2003, Walker plead guilty to the unlawful possession of marijuana, and
was sentenced to 30 days’ probation and a $100 fine.  In August 2003, his probation was
revoked for failure to pay the fine.  In September of 2003, a warrant was issued for failure
to pay fines and court costs.  In 2005, Walker was arrested and taken into custody, and
was released upon payment approximately a month later.  One criminal history point was
assessed under Guidelines § 4A1.1(c).  
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possession of marijuana or disorderly conduct.  As a result of these incidents, he received
a total of four criminal history points under Guidelines §§ 4A1.1(b) and (c),  and his3
Presentence Investigation Report set his Criminal History Category at III.  Thus, Walker’s
starting Guideline Range for imprisonment was calculated to be 87 to 108 months, to be
followed by a term of supervised release of three to five years.  Because the statutory
mandatory minimum was ten years under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii), the sentencing
court found that “the guidelines sentence [was] one hundred twenty months.”  (A81.)  In
December of 2007, Walker was sentenced to the ten-year mandatory minimum term of
imprisonment to be followed by a five-year term of supervised release.
II.
This Court will decline to exercise jurisdiction to review the merits of a
defendant’s appeal where a defendant knowingly and voluntarily waives the right to
In this case, the District Court noted, in its Statement of Reasons,4
The Court believes that a sentence of 120 months followed by 5 years of
5
appeal, unless the result will work a miscarriage of justice.  United States v. Gwinnett,
483 F.3d 200, 203 (3d Cir. 2007).  Of course, “a sentence based on constitutionally
impermissible criteria, such as race, or a sentence in excess of the statutory maximum
sentence for the defendant’s crime, can be challenged on appeal even if the defendant
executed a blanket waiver of his appeal rights.”  Id. (citation omitted). 
In the instant case, Walker acknowledged during the plea colloquy that he waived
his right to take a direct appeal.  (A46-48.)  It is apparent from the record that the waiver
was knowing and voluntary.  (A48-56.)  None of the waiver exceptions is present in this
case: the Government has not appealed, the sentence imposed does not exceed the
statutory maximum, and the mandatory minimum sentence imposed did not unreasonably
exceed the guideline range determined by the court.  Although Walker’s initial guideline
range was 87 to 108 months, “[w]here a statutorily required minimum sentence is greater
than the maximum of the applicable guideline range, the statutorily required minimum
sentence shall be the guideline sentence.”  U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(b). 
Further, at sentencing, in accordance with United States v. Gunter, 527 F.3d 282,
285 (3d Cir. 2008), the District Court correctly calculated Walker’s starting Guidelines
range; formally ruled on Walker’s motions regarding the Presentence Investigation
Report, noting on the record any effect the rulings had on the Guidelines calculations; and
exercised appropriate discretion by considering the relevant § 3553(a) factors.  4
supervised release adequately addresses the nature and circumstances of
this offense, as well as the history and background of the defendant.  In
particular, the Court has taken into account that Mr. Walker was involved in
a large drug distribution ring out of Detroit.  The Court has also taken into
consideration his past convictions and juvenile adjudications set forth in the
Presentence Report.  In imposing this sentence, the Court has considered
the kinds of sentences available, and the sentencing range set forth in the
guidelines, including any relevant policy statements issued by the
Sentencing Commission.  This sentence also takes into account the need to
avoid unwarranted disparities in sentencing among defendants with similar
records who have been found guilty of similar conduct.  At the same time,
this sentence reflects the seriousness of the offense and provides just
punishment for it; and also promotes respect for the law and affords
adequate deterrence to criminal conduct while protecting the public from
further crimes by the defendant.
(SA-49.  Accord A88.) 
6
 Even if we were to invalidate the waiver in this case, we would reject Walker’s
argument that the sentencing court should have exercised discretion in interpreting the
safety valve provision, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f).  In United States v. McKoy, 452 F.3d 234,
240 (3d Cir.), cert. denied 127 S. Ct. 449 (2006), we found that Booker did not render
eligibility requirements for safety-valve sentencing relief advisory.  Rather, applicability
of the safety valve continues to depend on a defendant’s criminal history without
consideration of the underlying circumstances of prior sentences.  Similarly, although
U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(b) permits a district court to reduce a defendant’s criminal history
category for overstatement of criminal history, the provision cannot be used to satisfy the
safety valve’s criminal history point requirement for one who otherwise exceeds it.
Moreover, in imposing the mandatory minimum sentence, the sentencing court
made a finding that Walker’s criminal history was not overstated by application of more
7than one criminal history point, as “[h]e had eight adjudications as a juvenile, and . . five
convictions in the presentence report, plus the one that’s been before the court today.  So,
I can’t . . . agree that the safety valve should not apply in this case.”  (A79.)  Finally, the
District Court did not err in denying Walker’s request to apply the minor participant base
level reduction provided for under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b).  In declining to apply a minor
role adjustment, instead imposing the mandatory minimum, the sentencing court pointed
out that Walker had stipulated to 135 grams of cocaine base, (A65), and accepted the
Government’s argument that he was one of the most active participants in supplying
crack cocaine to the confidential informant, (A69). 
In conclusion, we find that the issues Walker pursues here fall squarely within the
scope of his appellate waiver, he knowingly and voluntarily agreed to the waiver, and
enforcing the appellate waiver will not work a miscarriage of justice.  See United States v.
Goodson, 544 F.3d 529, 536 (3d Cir. 2008) (articulating three elements to be considered
when government invokes appellate waiver and defendant argues it does not bar appeal). 
Accordingly, we decline to exercise our jurisdiction to review the merits of his appeal. 
See, e.g., United States v. Corso, — F.3d —, 2008 WL 5205891 (3d Cir. Dec. 15, 2008)
(finding defendant’s appellate waiver precluded appeal challenging the district court's
calculation of the Guideline range).
III.
For these reasons, we affirm.
